1 paper(s) published in this issue.
[01]
Paper ID: IJMIEM-V1I3-001
Mixed Gambles in Product Recalls: How CEO Stock Options Drive Impression Management Tactics
Sumeet Malik , Taiyuan Wang, Luis Geoff Martin Gomez-Mejia
| University of Amsterdam
Management & Education
Pg. 1–22
Published: 23 Aug 2026
Executive compensation is a key topic in management research, focusing on how firms use incentives to align CEOs' decisions with shareholders' interests. Yet, we know little about the influence of stock-option compensation—a major component of CEO pay—on CEO decisions facing adverse events involving multiple stakeholders. Analyzing U.S. medical device recalls between 2004 and 2017, we examine how stock options induce CEOs to protect their existing wealth while pursuing potential gains. We find that CEOs with greater current option wealth are more likely to adopt short-term impression management (IM) tactics, such as strategically managing public communications to protect firm reputation during product recall events.
